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Abstract
The political theorist Michael Walzer has usually been taken as an opponent of global distributive
justice, on the basis that it is incompatible with collective autonomy, would endanger cultural
diversity, or simply on the basis that principles of global distributive justice cannot be coherently
envisaged, given cross-cultural disagreement about the nature and value of the social goods that
might be distributed. However in his recent work, Walzer demonstrates a surprising degree of
sympathy for the claims of global distributive justice, even of the egalitarian variety. But the precise
contours of his current position on global equality are not yet clearly developed. The paper,
therefore, attempts to reconstruct what that position might be, paying particular attention to the
conclusions we could draw firstly for our understanding of the opposition between global equality
and national self-determination (which is more complex than has sometimes been thought), and
secondly for the relationship between global equality and shared understandings.
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The relationship between the claims of global distributive justice, national self-
determination, and cultural diversity has attracted much attention recently. Three of
the most commonly voiced objections to global distributive justice*and especially,
on some accounts, the egalitarian variety*are first that it is incompatible with
respecting the collective autonomy (and responsibility) of national communities;
second that it cannot be achieved without endangering cultural diversity, perhaps
even crushing it in instituting the kind of global state that egalitarian justice might
require; and third that articulating and/or implementing principles of equality at the
global level simply cannot be done. On this last view, we have no metric at the global
level by way of which to judge whether resources or opportunities, for example, are
equally held, given that different communities differ in the way they conceive and
value the goods they distribute amongst themselves. John Rawls, for example,
levelled the first and second of these charges, whereas David Miller has more recently
levelled the first and the third.1
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In descriptions of this broadly sceptical camp, we usually find Michael Walzer.
Indeed in international relations theory in particular he seems to figure as the
‘communitarian’ theorist par excellence, and someone to range against the opposite
pole of ‘cosmopolitanism’. He is certainly often identified with the three claims
mentioned above*indeed when Miller wants to raise the third, ‘metric’ objection to
global egalitarianism, he tends to cite Walzer as a source of inspiration.2 Beyond his
pathbreaking work on just war theory, the one thing many people seem to ‘know’
about Walzer is that he rejects both the need for and the possibility of global
distributive justice. This paper aims to unsettle that identification. The image of
Walzer as the adamant critic of global distributive justice neglects the fact that in his
most recent work Walzer demonstrates a surprising degree of sympathy for the claims
of global justice, even of the egalitarian variety. But the precise nature of his position
on global equality remains to be explained, as do the lessons we might learn from it.
The paper, therefore, examines the contours of Walzer’s position, paying particular
attention to the conclusions those interested in global justice might draw in order to
better understand firstly the opposition between global equality and national self-
determination (which is more complex than has sometimes been thought), and
secondly the relationship between global equality and shared understandings. Since
Walzer has not written at length on the topic, and since what he has published
remains rather discursive and allusive*though, as always, elegant and in its own way
compelling*this cannot be a simple process of connecting the dots. Instead, the
project must be one of reconstructing a position that could square his more recent
comments with his earlier reasons for reticence about global equality. One possible
conclusion is that there is no coherent way of reconciling the two, in which case the
project is entirely recondite. But the present paper resists that view, and attempts to
unite the commitments*in the belief that in so doing, we might understand the
challenge to global equality better.
WALZER ON UNIVERSALISM
As is well known, contemporary debates about issues of distributive justice were
given an enormous fillip by the publication of John Rawls’s A Theory of Justice in the
1970s. This work presented a sophisticated argument for a broadly egalitarian form
of distributive justice, according to which goods should be distributed between
citizens according to a series of principles designed to integrate claims such as
equality of opportunity and priority to the worst off in society.3 Less clear, at that
time, were the implications for questions of global justice. But many of Rawls’s most
ardent followers were sure that the work did have implications and that they were
radical ones. Styling themselves as ‘cosmopolitans’, they suggested that the nation
into which one was born was a matter of brute luck and that one’s life-chances should
not suffer as a result of it. Borders are at best of derivative moral significance,
whereas the result of sustained reflection on questions of international morality
should be the advocacy of principles of global distributive justice.4 Examples included a
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‘Global Difference Principle’ that would tailor the distribution of a variety of goods
to meet, first and foremost, the interests of the worst off in the world. Less ambitious
but, still, highly challenging principles would seek to ensure that all communities had
access to a fair share of natural resources, or that the subsistence needs of all
inhabitants of our world were met as a matter of priority.5
Recent years have seen a proliferation of literature about global distributive justice
and about cosmopolitanism, and a series of proposals for distributive principles that
would have properly global scope. But not everyone within the academy has been
convinced. John Rawls was not, much to the disappointment of his erstwhile
supporters.6 Neither, on most accounts, was Michael Walzer. In this section I will
show why Walzer might be assumed to be predisposed against ideals of global
distributive justice*although towards the end of the section I will suggest that his
opposition has not been entirely straightforward.
For Walzer, by stark contrast to many contemporary cosmopolitans, justice is ‘a
social invention, variously made’.7 Theories of distributive justice must take account
of divergent social meanings; intelligible principles of distributive justice can only be
worked up with due reference to how different communities in fact conceive and
value the social goods that they distribute amongst themselves. To put it most
strongly, all arguments about justice are simply appeals to common meanings.8
Egalitarians, for instance, work up their arguments for socio-political reform from
the ideas already present in their own political cultures, and not from some ‘external’
source: ‘Moral and intellectual reform begins with intra-hegemonic struggle . . . it is
in large part a rearrangement of ideas already present in the old [system]’. Any
culture is likely to provide resources for social criticism, simply in virtue of the fact
that elites tend to promise us more in the way of equality (or freedom, or justice) than
they actually deliver*equality typically has a ‘real but distinctly limited value’ in the
hegemonic culture, but it also has larger, ‘utopian’ meanings that are occasionally
invoked within that hegemonic culture and that allow for radical criticism on the part
of the disaffected.9 Indeed all radical change has arisen from the kind of ‘organic’
social criticism whereby regimes are called upon to practice what they preach, or to
deliver on their promises.10
By contrast to this model of ‘internal’ social criticism, Walzer opposes the kind of
philosophical ‘abstraction’ typified by the search for transcendental principles
external to the shared understandings of a given community.11 If such transcendental
principles are ‘discovered’, a higher status will usually be claimed for them when
compared to everyday common understandings. The problem is that this mode of
accessing moral principles slides too easily into authoritarianism, whereby the values
of the community are ridden over rough-shod as the newly discovered ‘truth’ is
implemented (it is, after all, the truth). It is usually taken as a consequence of
this view that global distributive justice is simply unintelligible (given that we do not
agree, globally, on the meaning of the social goods that might be distributed), and
that any attempt to impose it from without will be unjust by definition. Certainly
philosophical ‘authoritarianism’, whereby communities might be governed by ideals
not shared by them, is at least as much of a danger globally as it is domestically.12 But
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this does not mean that Walzer is not a universalist on justice. In fact he distinguishes
between two forms of universalism, which he calls ‘covering-law’ and ‘reiterative
universalism’. The first suggests (in the mode of abstraction) that there is from the
outset a single moral law, which is accessible to reason and ought, when found, to
be imposed upon all*regardless of their actual beliefs. On the second view, the
content of any universal morality is precisely those principles that empirically
speaking are common to diverse communities. Elucidating what is universal is a
descriptive exercise insofar as it entails delineating the overlaps between the shared
understandings of distinct communities. The first form of universalism will impose
‘external’ constraints on any community, whereas the second, properly understood,
imposes only ‘internal’ constraints.13 Philosophical authoritarianism is not a danger
here, because the social critic is only interpreting what is already present in a political
culture. No special status is presumably to be claimed for that interpretation, beyond
pointing to its coherence. So Walzer is a universalist in this second sense.
This has clear implications for ethics in the international domain. When sketching
the principles of global justice, we must work on the basis of what is already present
and reiterated across cultures; but we should not expect too much convergence. To
use one of Walzer’s well-known metaphors, globally there is a common convergence
on a ‘thin’ set of issues concerning human rights and the conduct of war (‘The
principles of political independence and territorial integrity do not protect barbar-
ism’14), but also extending to prohibitions against murder, deception, and cruelty.
But ‘thick’ common meanings (such as would be needed to underpin a fully fledged
scheme of distributive justice) are just not present at the global level. As Walzer puts
it, ‘were we to take the globe as our setting, we would have to imagine what does not
yet exist. . . . We would have to imagine a common set of meanings’.15 Implementing
such imagined common meanings would, by extension from the argument above,
witness a slide into authoritarianism. Attempts to secure global distributive justice
would not secure broad agreement, and might instead require an authoritarian
state at the global level; and it is hard to envisage how a global state could be
compatible with cultural diversity.16
Walzer’s arguments here have been controversial, but they also resonate with some
more recent criticisms of (at least some visions of) global distributive justice. Rawls’s
position in The Law of Peoples is redolent of Walzer’s in a number of ways. Whereas
Rawls is keen to assure us that his eight principles of the Law of Peoples are ‘familiar
and traditional’, given ‘the [shared] history and usages of international law and
practice’, he is just as determined to remind us that the global public political culture,
such as it exists, does not provide the much denser stock of shared ideas necessary to
get a conception of global distributive justice off the ground.17 In the face of this, the
imposition of global distributive justice would violate a fundamental norm of
legitimacy: that principles of justice must be acceptable, or reasonably acceptable, to
the people they will govern.18 Though it is not employed by Rawls, the language of
thick and thin could easily have been applied here (the principles of the Law of
Peoples can be derived from a thin global consensus; support for global distributive
justice cannot). More specific opprobrium has recently been levelled by David Miller
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at the idea of egalitarian global justice. Such an idea, Miller tells us, neglects to
recognise that communities will legitimately define and distribute social goods in
different ways; in fact, no overall ranking of resources or opportunities is available
that would enable us to declare that global equality had been satisfied. In view of this,
global egalitarian justice in particular is, barring extensive cultural homogenisation, a
chimera.19 Indeed when global egalitarians have gotten specific about the implica-
tions of their views*as have some advocates of global equality of opportunity*other
critics have reiterated much the same point.20
Despite this, the picture of Walzer as a stalwart opponent of global distributive
justice was always a simplistic one. One early instance of sympathy for its claims
comes during the well-known discussion of the ethics of immigration. Though he
does want generally to argue for the right of communities to determine who might or
might not enter their borders, he also admits the moral force of Henry Sidgwick’s
claim that ‘a state possessing large tracts of unoccupied land [could not reserve] an
absolute right of excluding alien elements’.21 Discussing Australia’s ‘whites only’
immigration policy, he admits a tension between the right of collective self-
determination that he (generally) argues for, and the intuitive appeal of an argument
linking the obligation to admit immigrants to the availability of space (and also,
Walzer adds, resources); he appears unsure how to adjudicate between the two moral
claims. In this particular case what is at stake is very specific: the legitimacy of
refusing to admit non-white immigrants, rather than immigrants per se, to a rich and
spacious country. And it is not claimed that in this case Australia has an obligation to
admit immigrants in relation to its excess land: its leaders could legitimately choose
between admitting diverse immigrants into its existing territory, ceding excess land,
and remaining culturally (relatively) homogenous. But the claim that nation-states
can possess resources that are in excess of what is needed, in the face of pressing need
elsewhere,22 has by now been raised and cannot easily be dispensed with. Walzer
suggests that some of this ‘excess’ of resources will need to be redistributed: not all of
it, so that ‘simple equality’ resulted at the global level, but something short of that
which would still allow, and inevitably result, in different levels of wealth between
political communities. But this is to admit the possibility that principles of global
distributive justice might properly function, at least in a negative way, to criticise
existing distributions. Whilst Walzer has not argued that they might have a positive
role in delineating solutions cashed out in terms of duties of global distribu-
tive justice, that can of worms has at least been raised as an issue here. What form
should global redistribution take and how should we set its goals and parameters?
This is a difficult question, since much of Spheres of Justice has been devoted to
establishing that cross-community metrics of resources are not available to us: how
then to judge the level of excess and the level of entitlement? These questions are not
pursued, and Walzer claims that the form of the redistribution can be ‘fixed by some
version of collective mutual aid’.23 But the claim that some kind of ‘distributive
justice [is required] on a global scale’ has been raised and not refuted decisively by
any means. The question only achieves further attention in Walzer’s more recent
writings, to which we now turn.
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SECURING GLOBAL EQUALITY
As is well known, Walzer has in recent years become more willing to call for military
intervention to defend against gross human rights violations. He has not dropped the
presumption against intervention, but he has ‘found it easier and easier to over-ride
the presumption’,24 partly by expanding the category of abuses that presumably
infringe the minimalist universal moral code sufficiently to trump the claims of
collective autonomy. As part of that process, he has also argued more explicitly for
the establishment or entrenchment of various global institutions, including a world
criminal court with powers of arrest, and a United Nations with genuine powers of
military intervention.25
But the shift in position on global distributive justice is more pertinent to our
purposes here and more intriguing. Originally, in Spheres of Justice, Walzer gave the
impression (his comments of justice and immigration cited above notwithstanding)
that there could be no global distributive justice, because we could not agree on what
that meant in practice, given cultural pluralism. There has never been a universal
‘currency’ of distributive justice, because of the different ways in which different
cultures have understood the social goods they distribute amongst themselves.
Nevertheless in his recent work, Walzer recognises that the most drastic forms of
degradation and inequality occur in international society, and that there is a ‘global
hierarchy’ that needs tackling.26 This hierarchy can be understood, at least partially,
in a distributive sense. When evaluating the various contenders for an international
regime of governance (ranging from a world state to international anarchy), Walzer
suggests four criteria for judging them: (global) distributive justice, individual
freedom, cultural pluralism, and the promotion of peace.27 We learn little at this
stage about how to balance these priorities together (though see the section ‘‘Global
egalitarianism and national self-determination’’), but in any case principles of
distributive justice are now presented as one important criterion for the evaluation of
a regime of global governance. It is reiterated that a world state would be undesirable,
but at the same time it is conceded that its ability to pursue global distributive justice,
and ‘egalitarian reforms’ specifically, would be one thing that counted in its favour.28
On his current presentation, greater global equality*for individuals as well as
communities*is other things being equal a desirable goal. It might be thought here
that what Walzer is surely defending is a purely nation-regarding form of global
egalitarianism, which seeks only to secure a kind of parity between national
communities, so that they might be free from domination by each other, and might
be able to operate on a kind of internationally just playing-field. That, after all, would
accord somewhat better with his erstwhile defence of collective autonomy. But we
must be clear, in fact, that Walzer transcends this position by describing efforts to
reduce inequalities between individuals on a global scale. The kind of reform that a
stronger global institution would be able to enact would include, for example, the
establishment of universal labour standards or the redistribution of resources across
borders.29 As we will see below, instead of a world state, Walzer’s preferred vision is
one of a world of well-governed states*but that vision is at least partly attractive
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because it serves the goal of narrowing individual-regarding global inequalities. It is
suggested that the autonomy of nation-states is to be defended (amongst other
reasons) because it serves that end: entrenching state power (at least for some states)
is likely to get us closer to global equality than any alternative strategy. On Beitz’s
famous distinction, this sounds very much like cosmopolitanism about morality but
not about institutions.30
Walzer’s global approach is presented as an outgrowth of, or at least a parallel case
to, his approach to the politics of multiculturalism. He has long argued that a
satisfactory theory of equality must be liberal in its basic intuitions; indeed, his
theory of complex equality represents an exercise in extending the liberal ‘art of
separation’ onto the terrain of distributive justice.31 But he has also long argued that
liberalism is incomplete as a political theory, and one important reason for this is that
it pays insufficient attention to our associational life and our life as members of
communities, institutions, and groups. This after all forms the substance of the
periodic ‘communitarian correction’ of liberalism on his view. Rather than
communitarianism representing a genuine competitor to liberalism, various versions
of the communitarian challenge to liberalism have emerged at different times to
correct one of its key defects: its stubborn treatment of individuals outside of their
associational context. But for Walzer this myopic form of liberalism is self-defeating,
because individuals do live their lives in associational contexts that any adequate
theory of justice must attend to. For this reason a viable egalitarian politics will be
liberal, but it will not be exclusively liberal. In terms of domestic egalitarian politics,
liberalism is characterised by an ‘emancipatory’ model, which focuses on granting
equal opportunities to individuals, broadly speaking regardless of their group
membership. But according to Walzer the goals of the emancipatory model*though
though laudable*cannot effectively be secured by an approach that focuses on
granting opportunities to individuals but neglects the groups to which they belong.
We should pay attention to the groups individuals are members of if we want to
actually secure equality effectively. This is not because groups matter morally; it is a
matter chiefly of political efficacy. In practice, delivering on the promise of equality
means supplementing the emancipatory model with a model of ‘empowerment’,
The empowerment model is a necessary correction or, better, supplement to the
emancipatory model. It focuses on building the capacities, autonomy, and security of
the groups to which individuals belong.32 This focus is important because oppressed
groups often suffer from stigma, exclusion, and marginalisation, and political
remedies may need to be finely tailored to overcome those specific evils.
This is not to say, though, that empowerment will be achieved by a politics of
‘recognition’, simply understood. Rather than arguing directly for the eradication of
the stigma felt by oppressed groups, Walzer believes that the removal of stigma
will likely be achieved indirectly as a result of a given group’s achievement of material
security, political resources, and institutional stability.33 On the empowerment
model, then, though the goal remains the attainment of equal opportunities or
resources for individuals, the achievement of this depends on strengthening, rather
than ignoring, the groups to which we belong. For it is once the groups to which we
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belong have a secure material basis, that self-respect and broader social respect might
be expected to follow. This is why Walzer calls his multiculturalism a ‘meat-
and-potatoes’ (rather than, for instance, a recognition-based) variety: ‘the material
strength of groups [the safeguarding of the meat and potatoes of their collective life]
compels their mutual respect’. This material strength contributes to the sense of
efficacy of a group’s members, and provides a much surer route towards the liberal
goal of equality.34
The relationship between the emancipation and empowerment models is clear:
whereas the former supplies the moral goals, the latter supplies the strategy.
Significantly, Walzer depicts his position on global justice as a more or less
straightforward extension of this ‘meat-and-potatoes’ model of multiculturalism to
the global scale. Unfortunately, Walzer claims, cosmopolitans tend to simply
reproduce the emancipatory model at the global level and show no concern for
the fact that global equality for individuals*whilst unquestionably a key normative
goal*requires us, at the level of strategy, to empower them via strengthening the
groups to which they belong.35 As such liberal cosmopolitan theories, as currently
understood, appear incapable of delivering on their goals.36 Like the domestic
emancipatory model, they are seen as toothless in a world characterised by intense
feelings of belonging and identity*which should be used as tools for achieving
justice and not seen as mere obstacles to it. Global equality will not, in fact, be served
by a simple jump forwards to purely global institutions, though such institutions are
certainly (non-exclusively) necessary. Rather, according to Walzer, the delivery of
equality at the global level involves a two-track process, whereby on the one hand
global institutions are created that can regulate the environment, trade, labour, and
resources, but on the other hand weak states are themselves strengthened. We
certainly do need to move in the direction of further political centralisation, and civil
society organisations such as global political parties, global unions, and global
movements pursuing, for instance, gender equality can play a role in this37 as can
regional associations such as the European Union. The present state system cannot
provide an adequate response to all of the inequalities that characterise the
contemporary world.
But we also need to strengthen states at the same time*at least states that, at
present, are not capable of delivering meat and potatoes to their citizens. Thus, as
with the domestic brand of multicultural politics, it is clear that ‘[t]he terrible poverty
of so many people, in the third world especially, cannot be addressed without
attending to the groups to which they belong’.38 In the long-term, global equality will
only be served by securing ‘an empowered and effective state’ for all individuals.39
The ‘empowerment’ model suggests a two-track strategy because what is needed is
not only the addition of an additional layer of governance alongside the existing,
imperfect state system, but also the simultaneous fulfilment of the ideal of a world of
capable, functioning states. The idea that ‘a completed universalised state system’ is
imperative is not new to Walzer,40 and neither is the idea that its completion might
place obligations on the rich*though he now goes so far as to suggest that Thomas
Pogge’s Global Resources Dividend is an example of the kind of mechanism that
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could usefully achieve the resource flows necessary to deliver on this vision.41 But the
idea that this is somehow an agent of global egalitarianism is a new and significant
emphasis.
Thus a ‘meat-and-potatoes’ vision of global politics would depend on nations
enjoying genuine material security, with other nations similarly situated, and ‘roughly
equal’ to themselves in wealth and power. This, presumably, will also engender a
sense of efficacy on behalf of citizens, which might otherwise be damaged by a
premature rush to global centralisation:42 ‘On the way to becoming citizens of the
world, they must have an opportunity to be, and they must learn to be, competent
citizens of a particular state’.43 But we should be clear that the ‘meat-and-potatoes’
vision of world politics differs from (some) cosmopolitan visions not at the level of
ideals or morality (since it shares the goal of moving closer to equality between
individuals), but at the level of strategy or institutions (since it presses a strategy that
Walzer believes cosmopolitans have sorely neglected). In fact the distance between
Walzer and the cosmopolitans may be even less than he implies, since many if not all
cosmopolitans see some role for individual states in securing global distributive
justice. Either way, a world of dispersed power*with some centralisation but also a
strengthening of many states*is Walzer’s preferred political solution to the perva-
siveness of global inequality.
The next two sections, though, seek to examine in further depth quite where this
leaves us in terms of Walzer’s erstwhile theoretical commitments. The first seeks to
delineate the contours of his position on global egalitarianism more carefully. The
second examines the relationship between this position and his emphasis on shared
meanings, which appears more and more troubled. Here we confront the fact that
Walzer has given no definitive account of how he now sees the relationship playing
out. Whilst a definitive account could only be provided by Walzer himself, the option
open to us in the meantime is to narrow down the plausible ways in which the
relationship could be understood and assess the potentials and pitfalls of each
approach. It will be demonstrated that there is no straightforward way in which
Walzer could reconcile his defence of greater global equality and his commitment to
shared understandings, even if the former is a limited commitment; indeed, the issue
prompts troubling questions about Walzer’s project as a whole.
GLOBAL EGALITARIANISM AND NATIONAL SELF-DETERMINATION
Would Walzer’s current position count as a global egalitarian one? To produce a clear
answer to this question, we need to distinguish between several views on global
equality. Firstly, we might believe that all individuals across the globe are entitled to
equal concern and respect. It is controversial whether, and how, this view would
require us to limit global inequalities in practice, what criterion we should use in
doing so, and indeed whether this would qualify as a global egalitarian view in
anything other than a trivial sense. Secondly, we might believe that global inequalities
along at least some dimension are pro tanto unfair, although there might be principled
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reasons (such as a concern for collective autonomy) which dictate that, all things
considered, we should not address them. Advocates of this view will also disagree
about the currency of egalitarian justice and perhaps about its site and subjects.44
Thirdly, we might believe that many if not all global inequalities are unjust all things
considered and should be rectified. At least some global inequalities are sufficiently
unfair that this unfairness outweighs any competing moral claims (such as collective
autonomy) and should be acted upon. Note that this third view is compatible with a
variety of positions on the question of who has a responsibility to do so: we might
think that global inequalities are unjust, but that ‘local’ states bear the brunt of the
responsibility for addressing them; or we might attribute some remedial responsi-
bility to international organisations, or private citizens, just to give two examples.
Fourthly, we might believe that many if not all global inequalities are unjust, that they
should be addressed, and that we all share a more or less equal responsibility to
address them. Whilst egalitarian entitlements might be met in a number of ways, it is
when duties are both broadly shared and equally held that we may call them duties of
global distributive egalitarianism.
An important point to make at the outset is that these views betoken considerable
diversity, and a general reference to ‘global egalitarianism’ is inadequate in the face of
such diversity. Although the first view may be combinable with a wide variety of
political positions, it would certainly be legitimate for adherents of either our second,
third, and/or fourth views to describe themselves as global egalitarians. Furthermore,
any opposition between global egalitarianism and national self-determination is
unhelpful unless we further specify what we take global egalitarianism to mean.
A belief in our second view is obviously compatible with some degree of national
self-determination. At least some self-professed global egalitarians hold that the
claims of global egalitarianism can, at least on some issues, be defeated by the claims
of national self-determination, with the devil residing in the detail.45 More
importantly even our third view may be compatible with substantial national self-
determination, depending upon whom we believe to be responsible for rectifying
inequalities. We might believe that global inequalities are unjust, but also believe that
states bear the brunt of the responsibility for making good on equality. To push the
argument still further our fourth view, too, can be reconciled with some degree (and
perhaps a substantial degree) of national self-determination, depending upon which
goods, relations, or opportunities we would see distributed on an egalitarian basis.
Global egalitarians need not, after all, be egalitarians with regards to all goods.46
All of this suggests that there is potentially some space between condemning global
inequalities and calling for their correction (at least by global institutions)*and
perhaps this space is inhabited by Walzer himself. Walzer does appear prepared to
condemn the injustice of at least some global inequalities*indeed repeatedly so.
What we need to understand is why this does not appear to lead to the advocacy of a
concerted programme of global egalitarian reforms. To understand Walzer’s position
a little more precisely, insofar as we are able, it is useful to compare his position with
that of David Miller.
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As a vocal opponent of global egalitarianism, Miller accepts our first claim (that we
deserve equal respect) but is reticent about the second (that some inequalities are pro
tanto unfair). His general position is that whilst at the global level we rightly make
‘absolute’ moral judgements about the ills of poverty, ‘comparative’ judgements
about equality and inequality are out of place. He also suggests, to be sure, that
global egalitarianism is to be rejected at least partly because it is incompatible with
collective autonomy, which leaves open the possibility that inequalities are pro tanto
unfair but not, all things considered, unjust. But the general position is that global
inequalities are not intrinsically worrying in the first place, although some
global inequalities may have deleterious effects on other values (such as that of
political equality between states).47 Thus Miller can object to global inequalities on
instrumental grounds, as when inequality disturbs the potential for political equality.
But he will reject our third claim, at least if we read it as raising an intrinsic objection
to inequality. Finally, as is well known, he does not accept the fourth either, arguing
instead for a much more complex division of labour in dealing with the (by
hypothesis ‘absolute’) issues of global poverty and human rights violations.48
I want to suggest that, for all that Walzer’s position is often taken to run parallel to
Miller’s, it is significantly different. Unlike Miller, Walzer is not denying, now, that
global equality is a valid goal. He clearly accepts our second claim: that there are
inequalities which are pro tanto unfair. Inasmuch as his recent work displays a
surprisingly easy acceptance that global equality is a valid goal of global governance,
and that national autonomy itself is to be respected (in part) because it is
instrumentally useful to secure greater individual-regarding global equality, he also
appears to accept our third claim: that at least some global inequalities ought to be
rectified.
What Walzer does share with some sceptics of institutional ‘cosmopolitanism’ is
that, like Miller, he rejects our fourth claim: responsibility for tackling global
inequalities must be distributed not equally, but with a view to existing institutional
structures and to already-existing allegiances, though in cases of emergency or
remedial justice they may fall on distant others. The language of global distributive
justice plays a ‘negative’ role in criticising distributions, but does not commit us
positively to global egalitarian duties. Instead, Walzer suggests that the institutions
that exist now condition the responsibilities we have as actors. The existence of the
state in particular is crucial; we therefore find an argument for a distribution of
responsibilities rather like Miller’s, which places the brunt of responsibility on the
‘local’ nation-state.49 He still maintains that intervention by external powers in the
affairs of (more or less) sovereign states is quite likely to go wrong, which is why
pragmatically he still affirms that ‘social change is best achieved from within’.50 In
addition, he does suggest that individuals in effective states will bear responsibility for
success and failure; national communities might be entitled to the benefits of good
decision-making, and national autonomy should lead us to accept some global
inequalities.51 But he simultaneously affirms that global equality is the underlying
moral requirement. The resulting world of stronger states, where states are entitled
to at least some of the product of good decision-making, will likely be less than fully
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egalitarian. But we should nevertheless accept it because at the level of strategy it
represents the most egalitarian world we could realistically achieve.52
To repeat, then, a remaining point of divergence from many contemporary
proponents of global justice is that, though Walzer admits that the language of global
distributive justice is appropriate to diagnosing the inequalities that characterise the
contemporary world, this does not, on his view, commit us to formal duties of global
(re)distributive justice as the appropriate remedy. The argument remains that at the
global level ‘for now at least, ordinary moral principles regarding humane treatment
and mutual aid do more work than any specific account of distributive justice’.53 It is
also suggested that what Rawls called ‘natural duties’ would provide the correct
response to global inequalities,54 though some global transfers will be necessary. Like
Rawls, he suggests that Thomas Pogge’s idea of Global Resources Dividend could
provide a useful mechanism for securing the goal of a world of independent, fully
functioning states.55 But like Rawls, he does not quite commit himself to presenting
the Dividend as an instantiation of global distributive justice in practice.
GLOBAL EGALITARIANISM AND SHARED UNDERSTANDINGS
Walzer’s work is often taken to be locus classicus for the position that a metric for
global egalitarianism is not available*for the view that we cannot even know what
global equality means, given divergent social meanings between communities. One
thing that is particularly interesting about Walzer’s recent arguments about global
equality, however, is that he makes no appeal therein to his erstwhile concerns about
social meanings being particular to specific communities. But on what grounds
might Walzer maintain, in the light of his earlier arguments, that the concept of
global equality is even intelligible, or that we might develop strategies to move
towards an identifiably more equal world? We need to understand whether Walzer
has abandoned his scepticism about global principles of distributive justice based on
the diversity of social meanings across communities. It might be suggested that
Walzer’s advocacy of greater global equality and his concern for respecting local
meanings are not incompatible in the first place: his well-known theory of complex
equality demands that we distribute goods according to shared understandings,56
and if all communities distributed goods according to their own distinct under-
standings, a kind of global complex equality would result. Thus for ‘global equality’,
we should read complex equality made doubly complex as it maps across different
national communities. But this cannot be right. Walzer is clear that it is a result of
historical accident (largely contingent upon the separation and sheer pluralism of
social spheres in modern societies) that distributing goods according to shared
understandings will result, in liberal Western societies, in something we could
legitimately call equality.57 Distributing goods according to shared understandings in
traditional societies is just as likely to lead to hierarchy, caste privilege, and exclusion
(a conclusion that was accepted, it seemed).58 So when Walzer discusses global
equality, he cannot be arguing for complex equality writ globally, though he might be
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arguing for something more ‘simple’, such as rough equality of welfare or of resource
holdings, for instance.
But can such a notion be intelligible cross-culturally? The connection between
Walzer’s ‘internalist’, interpretivist methodology, and his more recent endorsement
of criteria of global egalitarianism is puzzling to say the least. Since Walzer does not
provide a definitive account of the connection between the two commitments, we are
confined to reconstructing the most plausible ways in which they could be reconciled
and assessing their strengths and weaknesses. It is unlikely that Walzer now believes
that there are no cultural obstacles to implementing global principles. More likely he
believes that global distributive principles will still need cashing out in terms of the
shared understandings of distinct communities. But once he would have argued
that this made such distributive principles unintelligible. Now, he appears to hold
that global distributive justice, and even global equality, is a meaningful concept
regardless of pluralism with regard to social meanings. How are we to understand
this apparent shift in position?
One way in which the commitments might be reconciled is to make a distinction
between cases of injustice*which Walzer accepts that we can sometimes agree on
cross-culturally, and principles of justice, on which agreement will be lacking. Walzer
has argued in the past that we can cross-culturally agree on clear cases of injustice in
some, usually extreme cases. But these instances are scattered, and our judgements
about them, even when collected together, are too patchy to knit together into actual
principles of global justice.59 But Walzer seems by now to have transcended this
earlier distinction. The sweeping condemnation of global inequalities that has been
mounted cannot sensibly be portrayed as referring to a disconnected series of isolated
cases. Although he may not be explicitly engaged in formulating principles, neither is
he on the safe ground of case-by-case analysis: some kind of step-change seems to
have occurred. Perhaps*though it seems unlikely*Walzer has come to distinguish
questions of ideal theory (at which level global distributive principles are appro-
priate) more sharply from questions of implementation. In a similar way Simon
Caney responds to critics of global equality of opportunity by sharply separating the
difficulty of spelling the ideal out in practice from questions about its normative
desirability.60
A second*again unlikely*possibility is that shared meanings have recently
emerged, perhaps as a result of cultural globalisation, which would make elaborating
principles of global distributive justice a plausible enterprise across cultures. When
Walzer argues for a stronger version of humanitarian intervention, he is explicit that
we cannot just take a short-cut to the moral conclusions we want (a maximal account
of human rights, for instance). We need to track emerging practices and institutions
in international society.61 But still, he could argue more or less plausibly that the
content of his new, slightly more interventionist position on human rights is
supported by the evolving global human rights culture.62 That culture may be
steadily shifting, and Walzer’s position may reflect those shifts. But human rights
inhabit, on Walzer’s view, a thin, minimalist moral consensus. It would be a much
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more surprising conclusion if the ‘thick’ shared understandings necessary to sustain
global egalitarianism had emerged in such a short period.
Thirdly, perhaps Walzer has been persuaded by accounts such as Martha
Nussbaum’s that suggest that there are some things (such as core capabilities) that
all citizens need, regardless of which community they hold citizenship in, though as
Nussbaum says the relevant capabilities might still be delivered differently in
different cultural contexts; it might on this basis remain possible to talk meaningfully
of global distributive justice and to diagnose at least the more egregious inequal-
ities.63 Perhaps when Walzer talks of global equality, he might merely mean
something rather basic in character, involving access to basic resources or
capabilities; global inequalities would therefore refer to instances where individuals
were deprived of these key preconditions of an adequate life. Such a conception of
equality would presumably still fall prey to questions about cultural diversity, but
might face such questions less acutely.
We do not know which of these arguments, if any, explain the apparent shift in
position. But perhaps Walzer’s discussion of global equality should not surprise us
in any case: as some astute critics have pointed out, although Walzer’s official
definition of equality hinges solely on whether goods are distributed in accordance
with their meanings or not (at least in Western societies exhibiting a plurality of
spheres and distributive criteria), he has long, from time to time, assessed
distributions as more or less egalitarian according to apparently more ‘objective’
criteria. Thus he concedes that a pluralist society in which all goods were distributed
according to their distinct meanings, in their distinct spheres, might lead to the same
people being ‘successful’ in every sphere, and concedes that this ‘would certainly
make for an inegalitarian society’.64 Whether or not we think such a situation
probable, the point is that here Walzer concedes that even in (spherically)
pluralist societies the distribution of goods according to their own appropriate
principles*and thus the eradication of what he calls dominance, defined as the illicit
conversion of advantage between spheres*might not lead to equality. Indeed he also
admits that in less complex societies, distributing goods according to their own
criteria will produce inequality, not equality. But if Walzer’s official position is that
equality is the absence of dominance, he must also, here, be operating with a second,
background, and presumably more ‘simple’ conception of equality.
But what might that be? If Walzer is operating with a background conception of
equality, which we can use to judge whether spherical pluralism might or might not
secure equality in practice, then the status of that conception*and its seeming
independence from shared understandings about the meanings of social goods*is
puzzling. Perhaps it involves ‘objective’ sociological criteria, and tries somehow to
integrate that with the more ‘interpretivist’ elements of his theory. But if so, it is not
clear how that integration will proceed, because the two elements appear likely to run
in tension. A more provocative suggestion would be that the theory of complex
equality offers not a definition of equality, but a strategy for how we might (in most
cases, in liberal democracies . . . ) deliver on the background conception of equality in
practice. If this is right, the implications for the theory of complex equality are serious:
C. Armstrong
64
it turns out that Walzer is really offering a method for achieving equality, however it
comes to be defined (and the work of defining it remains to be done). If so, then we
need to separate the levels of theorising in play more carefully. At the level of ideal
theory, Walzer could be committed to a conception of equality as something like
equality of welfare (to name but one possibility); this principle would be universal and
non-contextual. At the level of non-ideal theory, he could then take the view that
equal welfare will be served by different goods in different cultural contexts. Given
that different goods contribute differently to the welfare of different individuals in
different social settings*perhaps partly because they conceive of them and their value
in different ways*the universal goal of equal welfare might be served best by
distributing different goods according to different principles in different contexts.
This would be a troubling concession for Walzer, for it would redefine his
distributive theory as a ‘mere’ method of application, dependent on a prior,
undisclosed theory of egalitarian justice. But for present purposes the significant
point is that it would render his apparently untroubled discussion of global equality
and inequality less puzzling: though the theory of complex equality is not applicable
across communities, there is a background conception of equality that does not
depend so clearly on a given conception of social goods, and that can readily be used
to appraise global inequalities. The onus would then be on Walzer to spell out the
nature of this conception; he would owe us an account of what it means to discuss
‘global equality’ and what the relation is between that conception and (presump-
tively) shared understandings about the value of social goods. Just what role
disagreement about the meaning of social goods across communities would then
play in the delivery of global equality in practice remains to be seen.
CONCLUSIONS
We noted at the outset that Walzer has been widely identified with the view that
global distributive justice, and global egalitarianism in particular, are incompatible
with respecting collective autonomy, that achieving global justice would require
institutions that we would have reason to be reticent about creating, and that
we cannot even know what global justice means in practice in the face of cultural
diversity. The first two concerns appear to remain in play is his more recent work,
though they do not, if they ever did, suggest that we should reject the claims of global
justice entirely. The position, instead, seems to be that we should recognise the
attractions of greater global equality at the normative level, but resist the impetus to
create very powerful global distributions to achieve it. Instead we should continue
to place our faith in the state system, alongside some stronger*but not all-
powerful*global institutions. This suggests that Walzer is a moral cosmopolitan and
possibly even a kind of global egalitarian, insofar as he appears to consider the great
inequalities that characterise our world as objectionable from a normative point of
view. But he is certainly much less of an institutional cosmopolitan than are many
other supporters of greater global equality.
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All of this, though, raises interesting and difficult questions about the status of the
third concern, to the effect that a metric for judging global equality is unavailable.
Somehow, this supposed unavailability has not prevented Walzer from criticising
global inequalities and arguing that the state system, alongside stronger global
institutions, ought to aim to mitigate them. This accords with the view of some global
egalitarians, to the effect that despite the supposed difficulty of supplying a full and
satisfactory metric for equality, it is still crushingly apparent that we live in a very
unequal world, and that on a variety of significant measures*such as life expectancy,
literacy rates, years in education, income per capita*these inequalities are not only
identifiable but at least partly remediable.65 In the face of such inequalities, there is a
question about how much more refined a metric we really need before deciding that
addressing global inequality is a legitimate exercise with which we ought to charge
both states and global institutions.
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